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Using the economic freedom index and the newly developed KOF-index of globalization, it is 
shown that the Scandinavian welfare states have experienced faster, bigger and more consistent 
increases in these areas, compared to the smaller Central-European and the Anglo-Saxon welfare 
states. The market economy and globalization hence do not pose threats to these welfare states, 
but are instead neglected factors in explaining their survival and good economic performance. 
Big government decreases the economic freedom index by definition, but the welfare states 








The big Scandinavian welfare states show remarkable resilience, and many attempts have been 
made to explain the decent growth performance and the continued political support for the 
Scandinavian high tax societies. This paper points to two previously neglected, but potentially 
important factors: Big increases in economic freedom and globalization. 
 
Explaining welfare state survival is a fairly new research question for social scientists. In the early 
90s, both popular and academic debate focused highly on the problems caused by the welfare 
states’ high taxes and high levels of public expenditure – see for example Snower (1993), 
Lindbeck (1994) and the numerous examples of articles dismissing the Swedish model in 
publications such as The Economist listed in Lindert (2004). In addition to internal problems, 
authors such as Martin and Schumann (1997) and Strange (1996) argued that the external forces 
from globalization were undermining the fundaments for big government. 
 
Today, the debate has changed. A number of empirical studies show that high taxes and 
expenditures persist, and that the universal structure of the Scandinavian welfare states remains 
largely intact, despite the economic crisis of the early 90s.1 In fact, during the economic crisis of 
the 90s, welfare state cutbacks were biggest in the Anglo-Saxon countries where the welfare state 
was smaller to begin with – see for example Korpi and Palme (2003) and Swank (2002). As a 
result, scholars are now taking on the task of explaining what Rothstein and Lindbom (2004) calls 
“the mysterious survival of the Scandinavian welfare state”. 
 
The mystery does not primarily concern political support for big government – mainstream 
public choice theory provide several explanations of why big government may arise and persist in 
democracies.2 More curious is the good economic performance of big welfare states. As can be 
seen in Table 1, the Scandinavian welfare states have an above average growth record during the 




1 See for example Rothstein and Lindbom (2004), Castles (2004), Timonen (2001) and Kautto (1999). 






period 1970-2000: Sweden has to some extent lagged behind, but Finland and especially Norway 
have grown steadily. 
 
As will be demonstrated, the development of economic freedom and globalization in the 
Scandinavian welfare states since 1970 suggest that these countries have succeeded in 
compensating for negative effects of high taxes by a steeper increase in economic freedom and 
globalization. 
 
Table 1 Average growth in GDP per capita3 
   80s  90s  70-00 
Sweden  2.0  1.3  1.6 
Finland  3.2  1.6  2.6 
Norway  2.3  2.7  3.0 
Denmark  1.4  1.8  1.7 
Average  2.2  1.9  2.2 
        
Germany  1.9  1.4  2.0 
France  1.8  1.4  2.0 
Belgium  2.1  1.9  2.3 
Netherlands  1.4  2.4  2.0 
Italy  2.3  1.4  2.2 
Switzerland  1.7  0.4  0.9 
Average  1.9  1.5  1.9 
        
Canada  1.7  1.4  2.0 
Australia  1.8  2.0  1.8 
United Kingdom  2.2  1.8  2.1 
United States  2.0  2.1  2.2 
Average  1.9  1.8  2.0 
        
Average, OECD  2.0  1.8  2.1 
 
  
The paper proceeds as follows: The next section describes the theoretical base for the 
compensation hypothesis, the role of globalization, the used welfare state categories, and the 
indices used to measure economic freedom and globalization. In section three, I analyze the 
development of government size, economic freedom and globalization for three different types 









of welfare state. Finally, section four relates the empirical findings to some existing literature and 
discusses implications for future research. 
 
2. HYPOTHESES, DEFINITIONS AND MEASUREMENT 
According to the compensation hypothesis developed here, welfare states compensate for 
negative effects of high taxes in (at least) two ways: Economic freedom and globalization. Below 
I demonstrate that such a compensation is theoretically possible, and in section 3 it is shown that 
the compensation has indeed taken place.  
2.1 Compensation through economic freedom 
The fundament for prosperity in a market economy is a voluntary exchange of goods and 
services. In markets without market failures, this will produce an efficient allocation of resources 
and a division of labor. The most basic theoretical reason for expecting a negative effect of taxes 
on economic efficiency, is that transactions that would take place without taxation, may not take 
place when buyers or sellers in addition to the price they agree upon must may taxes. 
 
However, the price for a good or a service (with or without taxes) is only one part of the total 
cost of a transaction. Other transactions costs include for example the costs for buyers and 
sellers to find each other, to reach an agreement and mutually and credibly ensure each other that 
they will in fact stick to the agreement they make, and possibly also agree on how to solve 
potential disputes. It is obvious that for example well-defined property rights, a functioning legal 
system and a stable currency are factors that lower transaction costs drastically – and these 
factors are captured by the economic freedom index. 
 
Note that the total distortion created by taxation depends on how the tax-revenue is spent. For 
example, tax revenue used to finance cash benefits that are close substitute to labor income, 
induce higher inefficiencies because of the adverse effect on work incentives. On the other hand, 
tax revenue may also be spent on public goods or consumption with only small negative or even 
positive effects on economic efficiency – a point recently made forcefully by Lindert (2004). 
However, the costs created by the tax-wedge are inescapable, regardless of how the tax revenue is 
spent. Similarly, higher economic freedom decreases transaction costs regardless of how any tax 
revenue is spent. For this reason, this paper is focused on taxes and economic freedom, rather 






2.2 Compensation through globalization 
Traditionally, it has been assumed that increasing globalization, especially the increased mobility 
of labor and capital, will cause trouble for big welfare states – see for example Martin and 
Schumann (1997). There has been talk about a race to the bottom, in which countries compete 
with each other for high quality labor and capital, by lowering taxes and welfare benefits – see 
Sinn, 2004, 1997)  Peterson and Rom (1990) and Gramlich (1982). Recently, however, empirical 
evidence suggest that globalization and big welfare states are compatible – see Dreher (2006b), 
Mendoza and Tesar (2005) and Castles (2004).4 
 
Often overlooked, there are several mechanisms through which globalization may affect the 
welfare state in a positive way. For example, high taxes have a negative impact on the division of 
labor, but economic openness and free trade create more opportunities for a division of labor to 
arise. Furthermore, with openness comes not only access to new products through free trade, but 
also access to knowledge and technologies that play a fundamental role in economic growth 
according to the so-called ‘endogenous’ or ‘new’ growth theory (Romer, 1986, 1990). 
 
Iversen (2005) proposes a theory about welfare states that potentially explains why globalization 
and big welfare states often exist together: Big welfare states might run into problems if they did 
not apply a policy of economic openness: 
 
“[…] labor-intensive, low-productivity jobs do not thrive in the context of high social protection and intensive 
labor-market regulation, and without international trade countries cannot specialize in high value-added services. 
Lack of international trade and competition, therefore, not the growth of these, is the cause of current employment 
problems in high-protection countries.” [p. 74] 
 
According to this view, the negative effects of high transfers and labor-market regulation can be 
compensated by economic openness, because this allows welfare states to specialize in high 
value-added services. 
 




4 In fact, Rodrik (1998) argues that the big government of open economies is caused by the need for 
protection against economic volatility – an explanation dismissed on empirical grounds by among others 





2.3 Measuring economic freedom and globalization 
To examine the development of economic freedom and globalization, I use the Economic 
Freedom Index (EFI) developed by The Fraser Institute, and the index of globalization 
developed by the Konjunkturforschungsstelle in Zürich (the so-called KOF-index). 5  
 
The Economic Freedom Index (EFI) consists of five dimensions: Size of government (EFI1), 
legal structure and security of property rights (EFI2), access to sound money (EFI3), freedom to 
exchange with foreigners (EFI4), and regulation of credit, labor, and business (EFI5). Using 
several indicators in each dimension, the five dimensions are weighed together in a composite 
index, where 0 indicates the lowest and 10 the highest degree of economic freedom. 
 
The first component (EFI1) captures taxes, transfers, government enterprises and marginal tax 
rates – factors that per definition decrease the index for bigger welfare states. Thus, to increase 
overall economic freedom, welfare states must compensate their disadvantage in the government 
size dimension by being even freer in the other four dimensions. To test this, we use an index of 
economic freedom based only on EFI2-5, i.e. excluding the government size dimension. 
 
The KOF-index, developed and used for the first time by Dreher (2006a), consists of three areas, 
describing economic, social and political globalization respectively. Economic indicators describe 
trade flows, foreign investments and import barriers, social indicators include tourism, outgoing 
telephone calls and Internet usage, and political globalization captures membership in 
international organizations and diplomatic relations with other countries. 
 
While Iversen’s theory applies primarily to economic globalization, other mechanisms (such as 
the possibilities to absorb knowledge) may work through social and political globalization as well. 
For this reason we use both the entire index as well as the part capturing only economic 
globalization. 
 
A complete list of variables and weights can be found in the Appendix. 
 









2.4 Classifying welfare states 
According to Abrahamson (1999), classifying welfare states has become a business of its own. 
Important contributions to this literature are Titmuss (1974) and Esping-Andersen (1990). 
Titmuss (1974) uses three categories: the ‘marginal’ (typical for Anglo-Saxon countries), the 
‘industrial achievement’ (typical for Central European countries) and the ‘institutional’ (typical for 
the UK and Scandinavia). These correspond roughly to the categories identified by Esping-
Andersen (1990): The ‘liberal’, the ‘corporatist’ and the ‘social democratic’ welfare state, although 
UK is now put in the ‘liberal’ category. 
 
In a well-known paper, Korpi and Palme (1998) classify “social insurance institutions” as follows: 
Sweden, Norway and Finland are called Encompassing; Germany and France are called 
Corporatist; Canada, Netherlands, Switzerland, United Kingdom United States are called Basic 
Security; and finally Australia represents a Targeted system. The general pattern described in the 
next section of this paper, holds for this categorization as well. 
 
I refrain from the subtle intricacies of welfare state typologies. It is sufficient to note that there is 
considerable agreement that the Scandinavian welfare states are substantially different from the 
Central-European ones, and also from the US welfare state.6  They are bigger in several senses: 
Benefits are typically higher, cover larger shares of the population, and are to a smaller extent 
means-tested against recipients’ income. 
 
On the other side of the scale, we find ‘liberal’, ‘residual’ or ‘marginal’ welfare states such as the 
US and the UK. Here benefits are lower, more means-tested and the reliance on private funding 
and market provision of welfare services is bigger. Finally, we have the Central European 
(‘Christian democratic’ or ‘corporatist’) welfare states with high to fairly high taxes, and a high 
reliance on corporatism and family based solutions. 
 
Beyond these broad descriptions, there are disagreements regarding the details: Different authors 
use different number of categories, and some countries are not easily categorized. I follow 




6 There is, however, much less agreement on the appropriate labels of different categories: The labels 
Scandinavian, universal, institutional, encompassing and social democratic all refer roughly to the same 





Bradley et al. (2003) who stay close to Esping-Andersen’s classification by using three categories, 
containing the following countries: Scandinavian (Sweden, Norway, Finland, Denmark), Central-
European (Belgium, Netherlands, Germany, France, Italy, Switzerland) and Liberal (Australia, 
Canada, United Kingdom, United States).7 
 
3. ANALYSIS 
Table 2 shows the economic freedom index and the globalization index for the countries studied. 
The economic freedom index is shown with the government size component excluded as well, 
and the globalization index is also shown measuring only economic globalization. 
 
As expected, the Scandinavian countries had the lowest degree of economic freedom in 1970. 
Since then, however, the Scandinavian countries have experienced the largest increase in 
economic freedom. Looking at EFI2-5, i.e. the type of economic freedom that is not related to 
government size, the trajectory for the Scandinavian countries is even more remarkable, with an 
average increase of 1.67 index points, compared to 0.91 for the liberal and 0.11 for the Central-
European welfare states. Except for the Scandinavian countries, only France and the Netherlands 
have had a bigger increase in economic freedom when EFI1 is excluded, compared to the total 
EFI measure. 
 
For globalization, the liberal welfare states have had the biggest increase, but the Scandinavian 
ones are not far behind. Looking at economic globalization only, the Scandinavian and the 
Central-European welfare states both started higher and also experienced bigger increases than 
the liberal welfare states. 










Table 2 Levels and changes in economic freedom and globalization8 
 
 Country    
Overall economic 
freedom (EFI) 
Four areas of economic 
freedom, EFI2-5  































Sweden  5.30  2.03  0.079  6.13  2.40  0.092  2.79  2.19  0.055  3.84  1.21  0.051 
Finland  6.58  1.07  0.051  6.99  1.45  0.076  3.57  1.60  0.046  3.74  1.37  0.048 
Norway  6.58  1.34  0.065  6.59  1.42  0.073  2.46  1.45  0.040  3.79  0.90  0.040 
Denmark  5.96  1.08  0.051  7.02  1.40  0.075  2.58  1.51  0.037  3.52  0.90  0.031 
Average  6.10  1.38  0.062  6.68  1.67  0.079  2.85  1.69  0.045  3.72  1.09  0.043 
Central-
European                              
Germany  7.33  0.12  0.018  7.83  0.04  0.027  2.49  1.43  0.035  3.60  0.76  0.024 
France  6.19  0.72  0.044  6.70  1.53  0.066  2.93  1.69  0.049  3.55  1.24  0.041 
Belgium  7.27  0.10  0.015  8.17  -0.06  0.014  2.50  1.08  0.035  4.89  0.61  0.018 
Netherlands  6.99  0.75  0.045  7.66  0.87  0.051  2.18  1.25  0.031  3.97  1.60  0.045 
Italy  5.82  0.76  0.056  8.71  -1.66  -0.019  2.74  1.07  0.031  2.88  0.76  0.031 
Switzerland  7.37  0.80  0.030  7.70  -0.05  0.037  2.72  1.48  0.041  3.65  1.51  0.056 
Average  6.91  0.54  0.03  7.80  0.11  0.03  2.59  1.33  0.037  3.76  1.08  0.036 
Liberal                               
Canada  7.37  0.66  0.038  8.19  0.19  0.031  2.48  1.63  0.043  4.13  0.56  0.017 
Australia  6.61  1.24  0.064  7.41  0.86  0.053  2.43  1.83  0.050  3.11  1.23  0.051 
United  
Kingdom  5.94  2.21  0.098  6.51  2.06  0.086  2.46  1.99  0.046  2.78  1.72  0.058 
United  
States  6.96  1.23  0.056  7.77  0.51  0.034  3.32  1.84  0.052  4.19  0.24  0.012 
Average  6.50  1.33  0.06  7.23  0.91  0.05  2.67  1.82  0.048  3.55  0.94  0.034 
 
 
3.1 Economic freedom 
Let us now study the relationship between total government size (as measured by taxes share of 
GDP) and economic freedom (as measured by EFI2-5). In this case it is important not to use 
EFI1 because this component is almost per definition correlated with government size.9 The 




8 The table shows the increase in the index value over the entire period for which data is available, 1970 
to 2003, and the slope of a OLS-fitted linear trend for the 30-year period 1970-2000. 
9 Note, however, that there are ways to increase EFI1 without decreasing government size, for example 





trajectories of the three different types of welfare states are shown in Figure 1. The curves 
represent unweighted averages of the corresponding countries.10  
 



























The patterns reveal some interesting facts: 
 
•  All countries experienced a decrease in economic freedom in the early 70s. This decrease 
was biggest in the Central-European countries. 
•  The Scandinavian countries started from a very low level of economic freedom, but 
since the mid-70s, the development towards economic freedom has been faster than in 
other countries. 




reform has been undertaken in the Scandinavian countries, see Agell et al. (1996) for Sweden and 
Aarbu and Thoresen (1997) for Norway. 





•  In the mid-80s, liberal and Central-European welfare states experienced slower 
development of economic freedom, but the Scandinavian countries did not. As a result, 
the Scandinavian countries passed the Central-European ones, and have since been as 
free as the liberal welfare states. 
•  Between 1995 and 2000, the rapid development of economic freedom in Scandinavia 
suddenly halted, but at a very high level. 
 
The welfare state categories used seem to make sense: The countries in each category behave 
similarly, and the categories behave differently from each other. Excluding single countries do 
not alter the conclusions. Two countries deviate partially from the pattern, both in the Central-
European category. Italy started at very high levels of economic freedom in 1970 but experienced 
an extremely sharp decline. The Netherlands increased economic freedom in the 90s in a pace 
similar to the Scandinavian countries. Correcting for these two outliers, the curve for the Central-
European countries would start and end slightly lower. 
3.2 Globalization 
Turning to the globalization hypothesis, Figure 2 shows that a similar pattern emerges when we 
study the evolution of taxation and globalization, as measured by the KOF-index. Since 1985, the 
Scandinavian welfare states have had a faster increase in overall globalization. 
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Taxation and the KOF-globalization index
for different types of welfare states 1970-2000








Focusing economic globalization only, the Scandinavian and central European welfare states are 
rather similar – but the liberal welfare states are actually less globalized. While the low values in 
the beginning of the period are driven partly by the UK, this effect disappears as UK converge, 
but the liberal welfare states remain less globalized throughout the period. This supports the 
mechanism described by Iversen (2005), that countries with higher social protection and labor-
































3.3 Explaining growth 
As noted in the introduction, the effect of general government size on growth is highly debated 
and seems to be very hard to estimate robustly. A huge amount of research examines the relation 
between government size and growth – but no consensus has emerged.11 
 
In contrast, it is undisputed that economic freedom has a big and robust positive effect on 
growth: Doucouliagos and Ulubasoglu (2006) conduct a meta-study of 52 studies dealing with the 
impact of economic freedom on economic growth, and conclude that “economic freedom has a 
robust positive effect on economic growth regardless of how it is measured” (p. 68). 
 
By decomposing the index into its subcomponents and by using extreme bounds analysis and 
reweighted least squares, Berggren and Jordahl (2005) show that, by a big margin, the most 
robust component of the EFI-index in explaining growth is EFI2, i.e. legal structure and security 




11 For example, Lindert (2004) summarizes a number of studies with different results. Fölster and 





of property rights. As can be seen in Figure 4, the Scandinavian countries have had higher index 






























Thus, high-tax countries have had the biggest increases in economic freedom, especially in those 
areas which are most important for growth. For this reason, the lack of robust results in studies 
trying to estimate the effect of government size on growth, is not surprising: These studies 
typically do not control for economic freedom as captured by EFI2-5, or anything similar. 
 
The trajectories of different countries mean that cross-country comparisons today and in the 70s 
produce very different pictures, ash shown in Figure 5. In the 1970s, higher taxes were correlated 
with lower economic freedom, and the trade-off seemed steep when looking at a scatter plot. 
Since the mid-80s, this is no longer the case - the relation has actually become u-shaped, with the 
highest economic freedom in the low-tax liberal welfare states, and in the high tax Scandinavian 
welfare states. The Netherlands is an interesting outlier in this pattern: Its increase in economic 


















20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60
2000
EFI2-5
Taxes (% of GDP)
1970
  
Empirically, there is also a positive correlation between different measures of globalization and 
growth – see the survey and results based on the KOF-index in Dreher (2006a). This means that 
ideally, a measure of globalization should also be included when analyzing the effect of 
government size on growth. 
 
In Berggren and Jordahl (2005), government size as measured by EFI1, indicates that smaller 
government is correlated with higher growth, but this coefficient is not significant. This suggests 
that when controlling for other explaining variables, such as different measures of economic 
freedom, government size does not matter significantly for growth – but the effect of property 
rights and legal structure is both significant, big and robust. 
 
To sum up, the compensation hypothesis has empirical support, when it comes to economic 
freedom as well as globalization. Furthermore, since 1975 the Scandinavian countries have been 









particularly successful compared to other countries in improving economic freedom through 
secure property rights and legal structure, the area most robustly related to economic growth. 
4. CONCLUDING DISCUSSION 
In the Scandinavian countries, there are few signs that the dystopia described by Hayek (1944) in 
“The road to serfdom” is about to come true. On the contrary, big government seem to thrive in 
peaceful co-existence with high and increasing degrees of economic freedom. For over 30 years, 
the Scandinavian welfare states have increased economic freedom and openness in a remarkable 
way. This development does not support the idea that the welfare state is threatened by market 
economy, economic freedom and globalization. 
 
Except for the interesting case of the Netherlands, it is worth noting that the welfare states 
categories seem to make sense: There are clear similarities within groups and clear differences 
between groups. The qualitative results are not changed by excluding hard-to-classify countries 
(such as Canada, Australia and Denmark), or by using the classification of Korpi and Palme 
(1998) instead.  
 
The mechanisms pointed to in this paper does not exclude other explanations of welfare state 
survival. For example Rothstein and Lindbom (2004) argue that there are two reasons for the 
mysterious survival of the Swedish welfare state, both related to its organization.  First, the 
middle class has stakes in the continuity of the welfare state. Second, the system promotes 
attitudes of distributional and procedural justice that strengthens welfare state support. The 
importance of support from the broad middle class is noted by many scholars, for example Korpi 
and Palme (1998) and Goodin and Le Grand (1987). However, while these explanations without 
doubt play a big role in explaining political support, they do not explain the decent economic 
performance of high tax countries, as indicated by Table 1. 
 
Lindert (2004) attempts to explain what he calls the free-lunch puzzle, by which he means the 
absence of a robust and significant negative correlation between government size and growth. He 
proposes the following explanations: Compared to other countries, the high tax countries have a 





retirement and unemployment compensation that lower employment but raise productivity of 
those who work. Finally, Lindert argues that there are positive growth effects of social 
spending.13 None of these explanations contradict the explanation proposed here, and it will be 
left for future research to determine the relative importance of different factors. 
 
Finally, it should be noted that the quantitative resilience of high tax-societies does not imply that 
the organization of the welfare state today is the same as it was in the 70s. On the contrary, there 
is evidence that the welfare state has undergone some important organizational changes to 
increase flexibility and freedom of choice – see for example Blomqvist (2004). Nevertheless, the 
development in Scandinavia over the last 30 years as described in this paper clearly shows that 
economic freedom and globalization is highly compatible with high taxes and a big welfare state. 




13 Just like, Rothstein and Lindbom (2004), Lindert uses the case of Sweden to illustrate his arguments. 







The Areas and Components of the Economic Freedom Index 
 
1: Size of Government: Expenditures, Taxes, and Enterprises 
A. General government consumption spending as a percentage of total consumption. 
B. Transfers and subsidies as a percentage of GDP. 
C. Government enterprises and investment as a percentage of GDP. 
D. Top marginal tax rate (and income threshold to which it applies). 
i.  Top marginal income tax rate (and income threshold at which it applies) 
ii.  Top marginal income and payroll tax rate (and income threshold at which it applies) 
 
2: Legal Structure and Security of Property Rights 
A. Judicial independence: the judiciary is independent and not subject to interference by the government 
or parties in disputes. 
B. Impartial courts: A trusted legal framework exists for private businesses to challenge the legality of 
government actions or regulation. 
C. Protection of intellectual property. 
D. Military interference in rule of law and the political process. 
E. Integrity of the legal system. 
 
3: Access to Sound Money 
A. Average annual growth of the money supply in the last five years minus average annual growth of 
real GDP in the last ten years 
B. Standard inflation variability in the last five years.  
C. Recent inflation rate. 
D. Freedom to own foreign currency bank accounts domestically and abroad. 
 
4: Freedom to Trade Internationally 
A.  Taxes on international trade. 
i. Revenue from taxes on international trade as a percentage of exports plus imports. 
ii. Mean tariff rate. 
iii. Standard deviation of tariff rates. 
B.   Regulatory trade barriers. 
i. Hidden import barriers: No barriers other than published tariffs and quotas. 
ii. Costs of importing: the combined effect of import tariffs, licence fees, bank fees, and the time required 
for administrative red-tape raises costs of importing  equipment by (10 = 10% or less; 0 = more than 
50%). 
C. Actual size of trade sector compared to expected size. 
D. Difference between official exchange rate and black market rate. 





i. Access of citizens to foreign capital markets and foreign access to domestic capital markets.  
ii. Restrictions on the freedom of citizens to engage in capital market exchange with foreigners—index of 
capital controls among 13 IMF categories. 
 
5: Regulation of Credit, Labor, and Business 
A. Credit Market Regulations 
i. Ownership of banks: percentage of deposits held in privately owned banks. 
ii. Competition: domestic banks face competition from foreign banks. 
iii. Extension of credit: percentage of credit extended to private sector.  
iv. Avoidance of interest rate controls and regulations that lead to negative real interest rates. 
v. Interest rate controls: interest rate controls on bank deposits and/or loans are freely determined by the 
market. 
B. Labor Market Regulations 
i. Impact of minimum wage: the minimum wage, set by law, has little impact on wages because it is too 
low or not obeyed. 
ii. Hiring and firing practices: hiring and firing practices of companies are determined by private contract. 
iii. Share of labor force whose wages are set by centralized collective bargaining. 
iv. Unemployment Benefits: the unemployment benefits system preserves the incentive to work. 
v. Use of conscripts to obtain military personnel 
C. Business Regulations 
i. Price controls: extent to which businesses are free to set their own prices. 
ii. Administrative conditions and new businesses: administrative procedures are an important obstacle to 
starting a new business. 
iii. Time with government bureaucracy: senior management spends a substantial amount of time dealing 
with government bureaucracy. 
iv. Starting a new business: starting a new business is generally easy. 
v. Irregular payments: irregular, additional payments connected with import and export permits, business 
licenses, exchange controls, tax assessments, police protection, or loan applications are very rare. 
 
 
KOF Index of Globalization 2006: Variables and Weights   
 
A. Economic Globalization [34%] 
i) Data on Actual Flows (50%) 
Trade (percent of GDP) (21%) 
Foreign Direct Investment (percent of GDP) (26%) 
Portfolio Investment (percent of GDP) (27%) 
Income Payments to Foreign Nationals (percent of GDP) (26%) 
ii) Data on Restrictions (50%) 
Hidden Import Barriers (24%) 
Mean Tariff Rate (27%) 





Capital Account Restrictions (25%) 
B. Social Globalization [37%] 
i) Data on Personal Contact (26%) 
Outgoing Telephone Traffic (28%) 
Transfers (percent of GDP) (13%) 
International Tourism (21%) 
Telephone Average Cost of Call to US (11%) 
Foreign Population (percent of total population) (27%) 
ii) Data on Information Flows (37%) 
Telephone Mainlines (per 1000 people) (18%) 
Internet Hosts (per capita) (17%) 
Internet Users (share of population) (18%) 
Cable Television (per 1000 people) (15%) 
Daily Newspapers (per 1000 people) (16%) 
Radios (per 1000 people) (17%) 
iii) Data on Cultural Proximity (36%) 
Number of McDonald's Restaurants (per 100,000 people) (100%) 
C. Political Globalization [28%] 
Embassies in Country (36%) 
Membership in International Organizations (36%) 
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